Oggi (forse) si decide il mondiale

[Jean Valjean]

qualunque sarà la decisione probabilmente ci saranno degli appelli.

è l'ultimo appiglio per la Ferrari che sul campo ha perso (impensabile recuperare tutti quei punti in 4 GP).

se quanto riportato nelle ultime due settimane è vero (e-mail tra DLR e FA), sarà difficile evitare una giusta punizione, anche se il vantaggio tratto è stato minimo (le gomme di quest'anno non sono che lontane parenti di quelle dello scorso, la mclaren è concettualmente differente, ecc...).

Aggiungiamoci che, a dispetto di quanto dicano parecchi ferraristi, la FIA storicamente ha più favorito che danneggiato la Ferrari.

Ora non ci resta che aspettare il verdetto.

[mauricefree]

qualunque sarà la decisione probabilmente ci saranno degli appelli.

è l'ultimo appiglio per la Ferrari che sul campo ha perso (impensabile recuperare tutti quei punti in 4 GP).

se quanto riportato nelle ultime due settimane è vero (e-mail tra DLR e FA), sarà difficile evitare una giusta punizione, anche se il vantaggio tratto è stato minimo (le gomme di quest'anno non sono che lontane parenti di quelle dello scorso, la mclaren è concettualmente differente, ecc...).

Aggiungiamoci che, a dispetto di quanto dicano parecchi ferraristi, la FIA storicamente ha più favorito che danneggiato la Ferrari.

Ora non ci resta che aspettare il verdetto.

Diciamo che si decide se lo vincerà la mc laren con la lotta tra Fonso ed Hamilton o ci sarà una vittoria politica per decisione della FIA.

Se hanno saputo tutto fin dall'inizio anche Fonzo e DLR.....allora la punizione riguarderà anche i piloti....o il pilota se Hamilton non ha ricevuto info da Alonso, cosa ben difficle visti i rapporti fra i due....eh, eh.....

Modificato Settembre 13, 2007 da mauricefree

[Jean Valjean]

intanto posto la versione dei fatti di Coughlan. A pranzo pare che quelli della mclaren fossero molto tranquilli.

Analysis: Coughlan's version put to test

By Biranit Goren Thursday, September 13th 2007, 09:52 GMT

Former McLaren chief designer Mike Coughlan has apologised to Ferrari and expressed his 'enormous regret' for embarrassing his own team by his involvement in the ongoing espionage affair that surrounds the two outfits.

But his version of the events - of how he came to receive confidential Ferrari documents from Nigel Stepney and to what extent did he share that data with his team - could be tested at the World Motor Sport Council hearing today.

McLaren were already found in breach of the Formula One sporting code in a WMSC meeting on July 26th.

The Woking-based outfit escaped penalty on that occasion as there was no evidence to contradict Coughlan's admission that "McLaren received no benefit whatsoever in relation to their car or any aspect of its performance and that no use of any of the material has been made in relation to the car."

But the FIA has reconvened the WMSC after obtaining new evidence in recent days - reportedly including emails from McLaren drivers and reports of potentially extensive communication between Stepney and Coughlan.

Coughlan himself has so far maintained that he only communicated with Stepney on very few occasions and that no meaningful information was passed to other members of the McLaren team.

Furthermore, while Coughlan has confirmed that he received confidential Ferrari data from Stepney, he has stated that they are not close friends and that he only accepted the data because his 'engineering curiosity' got the better of him.

"He is not a close friend," Coughlan stated. "We are acquaintances who are both in the business of Formula One and have maintained cordial relations over the years.

"Stepney contacted me for the first time in five years on March 1st 2007.

"He subsequently telephoned me and informed me that he was very unhappy with the direction his career was taking at Ferrari and Mr Almondo's promotion above him.

"But he did not pass any technical information about Ferrari to me until mid-March 2007."

Communicating with Stepney

Coughlan claimed Stepney had contacted him only on a handful of occasions, comprising of a few email exchanges and three meetings face to face.

March 2007

Coughlan stated he was emailed by Stepney in March 2007 on three occasions, "on the basis that he wished to communicate concerns that certain features of Ferrari's car did not comply with the technical regulations."

These included Ferrari's floor device, a rear wing flap separator, and a technique to lower the floor of the car.

"Details of the floor device were sent to me by email to my McLaren work email address," Coughlan stated. "I showed the email fleetingly to Martin Whitmarsh, who asked me to take up the issue with Paddy Lowe, McLaren's engineering director.

"I produced a schematic drawing for Lowe, which I understand he forwarded to the FIA. The FIA subsequently declared the floor device as falling outside the regulations.

"Details of the rear wing device were also sent by email to me. I briefly showed this email to Lowe. I understand he reported this to Charlie Whiting of the FIA at the Melbourne Grand Prix, but he was of the opinion that the design was legal.

"As for the information about the subtle engineering technique, I felt it was inconsequential and so I did not show these details to anyone."

April 2007

Coughlan claimed that he did not feel comfortable by receiving such information from Stepney and wanted to stop the line of communication.

McLaren had promptly set up a firewall to block any electronic communications from Stepney, and Coughlan himself arranged to meet Stepney in person, "to ask him to stop communicating to me any further."

The two met at Barcelona Airport on April 28th 2007, and went to a restaurant at the city's marina.

"During the course of conversation, we discussed a feature of how Ferrari's rear brake disc works. This discussion is typical of the types of conversations that often take place between motor racing engineers in relation to non-critical aspects of car design.

"Stepney made a sketch to show how the brake disc worked. My view was that his drawing incorrectly characterised how this feature looked based on photographs taken at races, but I did not comment on this.

"After having lunch with Stepney I asked him not to send to me anything further.

"I then asked Stepney to drive me to the Airport. When I got into his car, he passed me a bundle of documents which he asked me to look at.

"My engineering curiosity got the better of me and I foolishly took the documents from him. I casually flicked through them over the course of 25 minutes or so the journey took for Stepney to drive me to the airport. I kept hold of the documents and took them home with me.

"I did not look further at the documents that weekend."

According to Coughlan, he met again socially with Stepney for dinner while the latter was in England. "He handed me what he said were drawings of Ferrari's brake disc, which comprised a number of A4 pages.

"I assume he realised that he had incorrectly sketched this at our meeting in Barcelona.

"So as not to appear rude, I took the pages away from the dinner but did not show them to anyone, study them or make any use of them. I put the pages with the other documents Stepney had given to me in Barcelona."

June 2007

Coughlan claimed his only other meeting with Stepney was on June 1st 2007, when the two met with Honda team chief Nick Fry at Heathrow.

"The meeting had been arranged by Stepney to discuss a possible career opportunity for him at Honda," Coughlan stated.

"I attended out of curiosity to hear what Fry had to say in relation to possible opportunities for myself at a later date. No Ferrari information was passed to Fry in the course of that meeting or by me at any other time."

Communicating with McLaren staff

According to Coughlan, only a few men at McLaren knew of his communication with Stepney - and only little information was actually conveyed to each. These include:

1) McLaren F1 CEO Martin Whitmarsh - Coughlan said he showed Whitmarsh the email Stepney sent him in March, regarding the Ferrari floor. This is the only time Coughlan mentioned the team's CEO.

2) McLaren F1 engineering director Paddy Lowe - Coughlan mentioned Lowe in relations to the initial information sent by Stepney, relating to devices on the Ferrari car that may be illegal.

He gave Lowe a drawing of the Ferrari floor, which Lowe then sent to the FIA as part of the team's inquiry about the legality of that device.

He showed Lowe an email from Stepney, also around the same time, regarding the Ferrari rear wing device - which Lowe also discussed with the FIA, although this device was deemed legal by the governing body.

3) McLaren F1 managing director Jonathan Neale - Coughlan stated that Neale was the person who took steps to block electronic communications from Stepney after the Australian Grand Prix.

"Following the Melbourne weekend, I expressed my concerns to Neale about Stepney sending information to me," Coughlan stated. "As public reports began to emerge of Nigel Stepney's deepening rift with Ferrari, I understand that Neale instructed McLaren's IT department to install a firewall to block any further electronic communication from him, which I believe was put in place in mid-April 2007."

Coughlan also told Neale he will be meeting Stepney in order "to ask him to stop communicating to me any further."

According to Coughlan, he and Neale met for breakfast on May 25th 2007 "to discuss my future with McLaren and the concerns I had."

Coughlan claimed that "At the very end of the discussion, across the table, I showed him two or so images from the material that Stepney had given to me, which was for no more than a few seconds.

"Neale reacted with surprise and immediately said that I should not have these documents and McLaren wanted nothing to do with them."

4) McLaren F1 engineer Rob Taylor - Coughlan claimed he had only ever shown Taylor a drawing made by Stepney relating to Ferrari's brake system, upon his return to the McLaren factory from meeting Stepney in Barcelona.

"I recall fleetingly showing the brake balance assembly diagram to Taylor as a point of historic interest, as it was a very similar part to the one he designed approximately 10 years ago at FDD during our time there together," Coughlan stated.

The Ferrari data

Coughlan has contended thus far that he had made no use of the 780-page dossier he took from Stepney at Barcelona. In fact, the Briton has claimed he barely looked at the material.

"I looked at the papers given to me by Stepney on only a few occasions," Coughlan stated. "Certainly the time I spent looking at them in total between receiving them and the search at my house on July 3rd was no more than one to two hours.

"I did not look at them in a discursive or methodical way, nor did I look at all of the documents.

"In the limited period of time I spent reviewing the documents, it was not possible to glean anything that would be of material use to McLaren that we did not already know from our own observation and photographs of Ferrari's car."

As for the scanned documents, Coughlan said he did not delve into these either.

"I only viewed the discs on one occasion," he stated, "solely to check that the documents had been properly scanned onto the discs and to see whether the image quality had been maintained. I reviewed perhaps a dozen pages of material very briefly for no more than a few minutes."

Coughlan, however, made no mention of data such as weight distribution, tyre use or race strategy. Moreover, he has claimed that at the time of his breakfast with Neale, on May 25, he had "resolved that the documents should no longer be in my possession.

"I had initially accepted them out of engineering curiosity but now felt increasingly uncomfortable holding on to them," Coughlan stated.

But, according to his version of events, it wasn't until he returned from the United States Grand Prix - which was held on June 17 - that he and his wife, Trudy, shredded and burned the documents, although not before making an electronic copy of them in a nearby shop.

"I cannot recall the exact date, but in early June 2007 I asked my wife to arrange for the documents to be scanned onto compact discs," Coughlan stated.

"I had decided to destroy all of the documents but I wanted to retain a copy in a more compact form that I could return to Stepney in the event that he requested their return.

"I gave the documents to my wife and asked her to get them scanned onto disk. Around the same time I ordered a document shredder, which I intended to use to shred the documents at my house once they had been copied.

"In or around 8 June 2007 I travelled to the United States for the US Grand Prix at Indianapolis. While I was in the United States, my wife took the documents to a shop and these were copied onto two compact discs.

"Following my return from the United States, I asked my wife to set up the new shredder and shred the documents and then burn them. She did this on 20 June 2007."

Quite coincidentally, news of a new criminal investigation against Nigel Stepney first began in the Indianapolis paddock...

Coughlan's remorse

There's no doubt that Coughlan indeed regrets his actions in the entire affair. Regardless of how Ferrari's civil case against him pans out in the London High Court, or what McLaren will endure in today's World Motor Sport Council hearing, Coughlan is likely to never work again in the sport he has loved so much.

"I sincerely regret my actions in accepting the information from Stepney and the fact that I did not take more steps to stop him providing this information to me," Coughlan stated.

"With the benefit of hindsight, I can now see how I should have handled matters very differently, but at the time, having found myself in an uncomfortable and difficult position, my indecision as to how best to deal with this led me to fail to take proper action at all.

"I wish to apologise to Ferrari. My passion and enthusiasm for race-car engineering design has caused me to exercise poor judgement in my dealings with Mr Stepney.

"I enormously regret the unfair embarrassment I have caused to McLaren and to my wife.

"I can honestly say that McLaren received no benefit whatsoever in relation to their car or any aspect of its performance and that no use of any of the material has been made in relation to the car."

The problem is, that even genuine remorse may not be enough to undo the damage that has already been done.

[Jean Valjean]

The World Motor Sport Council has decided to exclude McLaren-Mercedes from the 2007 and 2008 Formula One world championship.

per ora è tutto quello che si riesce a leggere. aggiornamenti a breve.

[Akelitz]

notizia però tutta da confermare.

[mauricefree]

Se confermato sarebbe una botta tremenda per tutti...non solo per la Mc Laren perchè sarebbe peggio che calciopoli...

e ci sarebbe una fuga di sponsors, con calo di credibilità pari a zero....forse l'unico contento sara' fonso...che non vedeva l'ora di andarsene dalla Mc Laren.....

[Jean Valjean]

anche perché calciopoli fu un fenomeno italiano, qui si parla di uno degli sport più seguiti al mondo... comunque aspettiamo la sentenza e gli eventuali ricorsi. soprattutto sarà interessante leggere le motivazioni.

[Cleon]

A me risultano 100 milioni di dollari di multa e azzeramento della classifica costruttori di quest'anno.

Niente penalità ai piloti e niente squalifiche.

Se fosse così , direi punizione giusta.

[Jean Valjean]

infatti cleon.

il precedente trafiletto, tratto da autosport.com (e credo riportato altrove) era scomparso dopo poco (evidentemente una soffiata un po' distorta)

[Akelitz]

definirla una punizione giusta mi sembra però un po' forte.

per me è una sentenza ridicola.

[pachu]

Finalmente abbiamo capito a cosa serve veramente il mondiale costruttori: a non punire i colpevoli.

[liotru]

definirla una punizione giusta mi sembra però un po' forte.

per me è una sentenza ridicola.

[mauricefree]

definirla una punizione giusta mi sembra però un po' forte.

per me è una sentenza ridicola.

Ti devo dar ragione, non è detto pero' per le stesse motivazioni:

Per me è la solita sentenza all'italiana "politica" per salvare l'immagine del baraccone, accontantare parzialmente la Ferrari e non distruggere la Mc Laren.

Perchè i casi sono due: se il team è colpevole (una sola persona o tutti) SOLO di essere entrata in possesso del materiale, ma non ne abbia fatto utilizzo...la punizione è persino eccessiva visto che l'auto sarebbe frutto dei soli studi Mc Laren. Visto che NON è stata provata l'utilizzazione di segreti ferrari per la MP4/22, capisco il mega multone ma l'azzeramento dei punti no.

Viceversa se come penso non si è trovato il modo di scoprire se il team di woking abbia utilizzato i segreti per migliorare la sua vettura si è fatto che dividere la torta in due :

Mondiale costruttori alla Ferrrari anche se va' meno forte...

e salvi i piloti perchè"hanno collaborato"....(sembrano quelle sentenze in stile politichese.....).

Se hanno collaborato (DLR e Fonso e lo scambio di mail dopo che DLR aveva ricevuto info da Coughlan) è perchè erano colpevoli e consapevoli del dossier....quindi perchè non punire anche loro?

In una parola sola PAGLIACCIATA.

Modificato Settembre 14, 2007 da mauricefree

[pachu]

Se davvero uno non vuole neanche guardare i progetti rubati, appena saputa la cosa, licenzia Coughlan, gli ordina di distruggere tutto e denuncia tutto alla Fia. Ogni altra reazione e' sospetta.

Modificato Settembre 14, 2007 da pachu

[NoRegrets]

definirla una punizione giusta mi sembra però un po' forte.

per me è una sentenza ridicola.

Finalmente abbiamo capito a cosa serve veramente il mondiale costruttori: a non punire i colpevoli.

La mclaren guadagna 250 milioni circa durante tutto l'anno, tra sponsor, gare e altri utili.

Gran parte di questi soldi li guadagna dal costruttori.

A conti fatti, tra multa, azzeramento di questo mondiale, danni d'immagine (vedasi sponsor), mancati fondi per lo sviluppo della vettura del prossimo anno, il danno economico supera i 300 milioni

E questo per una cosa per cui il vero staff McLaren non è stato considerato colpevole, ma solo dei dipendenti.

Vedete voi.

[pachu]

300 mi paiono troppi. Intanto non si e' ancora capito se nei 100 e' incluso il mancato introito della vittoria nel mondiale costruttori. Secondo la fuga degli sponsor e' tutta da dimostrare. Terzo hanno avuto in mano i disegni del principale avversario, non hanno detto niente, e vincono il mondiale piloti. E si parlava di esclusione, all'epoca della prima sentenza.

Faranno anche ricorso, pero' secondo me hanno tirato un bel sospiro di sollievo.

[mauricefree]

La mclaren guadagna 250 milioni circa durante tutto l'anno, tra sponsor, gare e altri utili.

Gran parte di questi soldi li guadagna dal costruttori.

A conti fatti, tra multa, azzeramento di questo mondiale, danni d'immagine (vedasi sponsor), mancati fondi per lo sviluppo della vettura del prossimo anno, il danno economico supera i 300 milioni

E questo per una cosa per cui il vero staff McLaren non è stato considerato colpevole, ma solo dei dipendenti.

Vedete voi.

quanto guadagna di preciso la Mc Laren all'anno o ricava non lo so e neppure i mancati introiti dovuti alla multa: Premio per vittoria nei costruttori e fuga sponsors.

di sicuro confermo che hanno preso una decisione per non scontentare troppo la Ferrari, tenere l'interesse per il mondiale non punendo i piloti...quindi la FIA non è riuscita a dimostrare che la Mc Laren abbia usufruito fattivamente del dossier per la sua vettura, altrimenti avrebbe sicuramente dovuto azzerare i punti dei piloti.

Per concludere.....hanno cercato di minimizzare il danno d'immagine per questo sport che comunque subisce un grosso colpo e nnello stesso tempo risarcire la Rossa che ora gonfia il petto per la verità ristabilita, secondo loro, e tutto è ora a posto.

Modificato Settembre 14, 2007 da mauricefree

[NoRegrets]

Intanto non si e' ancora capito se nei 100 e' incluso il mancato introito della vittoria nel mondiale costruttori

ma a che gioco stiamo giocando?

100 da pagare, altri 100 e rotti da non intascare + tutto quello che viene dagli sponsor e via dicendo

[Anomander Rake]

World Motor Sport Council

Decision

Re: Article 151© International Sporting Code – Vodafone McLaren

Mercedes

13 September 2007

The World Motor Sport Council (“WMSC”) met on 13th September 2007 to consider a

charge that Vodafone McLaren Mercedes (“McLaren”) had breached Article 151© of

the International Sporting Code.

1 Background

1.1 Scuderia Ferrari Marlboro ("Ferrari") has submitted that it received information

on 24 June 2007 suggesting that unauthorised use may have been made of certain

of its confidential information. Ferrari has submitted that it subsequently learned

that certain of its confidential information had come into possession of Mr.

Michael Coughlan (“Coughlan”), the then Chief Designer of McLaren.

1.2 On 3 July 2007, in the context of litigation in the High Court of England and

Wales ("High Court Proceedings") between Ferrari and Coughlan, a search was

undertaken at the private residence of Coughlan under the authority of that Court.

According to the evidence before the WMSC, during that search, a dossier of

some 780 pages of confidential information belonging to Ferrari was recovered.

1.3 In light of the results of the search, Ferrari wrote to the FIA late on 3 July 2007

inviting it to consider whether the FIA should launch an investigation into the

matter.

1.4 After preliminary investigations, on 12 July 2007 the FIA wrote to McLaren

requesting it to appear at an extraordinary meeting of the WMSC in Paris on 26

July 2007 (“the 26 July WMSC meeting”). McLaren was informed that, at the 26

July WMSC meeting, it would be asked to answer the charge that between March

and July 2007, in breach of Article 151© of the International Sporting Code, it

had unauthorised possession of documents and confidential information belonging

to Ferrari. In particular, McLaren was charged with the unauthorised possession

of one or more of the following technical documents that could be used for one or

more of the following purposes: designing, engineering, building, checking,

testing, developing and running a 2007 Ferrari Formula One car, including

drawings, lay-out and digital mock-up schemes, technical documents and reports

and procedures relating, amongst other things, to weight distribution,

aerodynamics, component designs, suspension, gearbox, hydraulic, water, oil and

fuel system designs, assembly and building technology designs.

1.5 In response to the charge, McLaren made extensive written submissions in

advance of the 26 July WMSC meeting and made detailed oral argument at the

meeting itself. McLaren did not dispute that Coughlan had come into possession

of Ferrari confidential information but argued, inter alia:

(i) that the Ferrari confidential information in question had not been circulated

within McLaren;

(ii) that McLaren had neither used nor benefited from the receipt by Coughlan of

the Ferrari confidential information; and

(iii) that the actions of Coughlan in receiving and dealing with the Ferrari

confidential information were those of a "rogue employee" for which McLaren

should not be held responsible.

1.6 The WMSC considered the arguments and evidence presented by McLaren at the

26 July WMSC meeting and came to the conclusion that McLaren had been in

possession of Ferrari confidential information and was therefore in breach of

Article 151© of the International Sporting Code.

1.7 Although a number of unsatisfactory elements were noted during the

deliberations, in assessing the gravity of the breach, the WMSC concluded that

there was insufficient evidence that the information was used in such a way as to

interfere with the running of the FIA Formula One World Championship ("the

Championship").

1.8 However, conscious of, inter alia, the fact that several related procedures were

ongoing (including, notably, the High Court Proceedings, a criminal investigation

in Italy and various internal forensic investigations at McLaren and Ferrari), the

WMSC explicitly reserved the right to revisit its conclusions if further

information came to light, in particular information showing that Ferrari

confidential information had been used by McLaren to the detriment of the

Championship.

1.9 The following Decision was therefore reached:

“The WMSC is satisfied that Vodafone McLaren Mercedes was in possession of

confidential Ferrari information and is therefore in breach of article 151c of the

International Sporting Code. However, there is insufficient evidence that this

information was used in such a way as to interfere improperly with the FIA

Formula One World Championship. We therefore impose no penalty.

But if it is found in the future that the Ferrari information has been used to the

detriment of the championship, we reserve the right to invite Vodafone McLaren

Mercedes back in front of the WMSC where it will face the possibility of exclusion

from not only the 2007 championship but also the 2008 championship.

The WMSC will also invite Mr Stepney and Mr Coughlan to show reason why

they should not be banned from international motor sport for a lengthy period

and the WMSC has delegated authority to deal with this matter to the legal

department of the FIA.”

2 Re-convening of WMSC

2.1 Subsequent to the WMSC Decision of 26 July 2007 (the “26 July Decision”), new

evidence came to light which, in the FIA’s assessment merited consideration by

the WMSC.

2.2 A new meeting of the WMSC was therefore convened for 13 September 2007

(“the 13 September WMSC meeting”).

2.3 All relevant parties (including McLaren and Ferrari) were informed of the new

meeting and were given copies of the new evidence put before the WMSC (in

some limited cases, after redaction of confidential information). McLaren and

Ferrari were invited to make written submissions which have been duly received

by the WMSC.

2.4 Oral submissions and explanations have also been made on behalf of McLaren

and Ferrari and at the 13 September WMSC meeting, the WMSC has put

questions to those concerned. Opportunities were also offered and taken up for

McLaren and Ferrari to cross-examine each others’ witnesses.

2.5 Some of the key elements that the WMSC has considered are set out below. In

light of the strong imperative in the interests of the sport to issue a swift ruling,

the following does not constitute an exhaustive list of the elements considered nor

does it purport to be a summary of all of the evidence put before the WMSC.

3 New Evidence – E-mails between McLaren Drivers

3.1 In the period after the 26 July Decision, the FIA was made aware of a specific

allegation that e-mails relevant to the FIA’s investigation had been exchanged

between certain McLaren drivers.

3.2 The FIA therefore wrote to three McLaren drivers (Mr. Alonso, Mr. Hamilton and

Mr. de la Rosa) to establish whether or not this allegation had any basis in fact

and requested that they produce copies of any relevant documents, including any

electronic communications (howsoever conveyed or stored) which may be

relevant to this case and which make reference to Ferrari, Ferrari’s employee

Nigel Stepney (“Stepney”) or any technical or other information coming from or

connected with either Ferrari or Stepney.

3.3 The McLaren drivers were reminded of their duty as competitors and Super

Licence holders to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of the Formula One World

Championship. Given the importance of establishing the facts and that the

information might not come out any other way, the FIA offered the assurance that

any information made available in response to the letter would not result in any

proceedings against the drivers personally under the International Sporting Code

or the Formula One Regulations. However, the drivers were notified that if it

later came to light that they had withheld any potentially relevant information,

serious consequences could follow.

3.4 All three drivers responded. Mr. Hamilton responded that he had no information

responsive to the FIA’s request. Mr. Alonso and Mr. de la Rosa both submitted emails

to the FIA which the WMSC finds highly relevant. Subsequently (at

McLaren’s request) both Mr. Alonso and Mr. de la Rosa made written statements

to the WMSC verifying that these e-mails were sent and received and offering

context and explanations regarding the e-mails. The e-mails show unequivocally

that both Mr. Alonso and Mr. de la Rosa received confidential Ferrari information

via Coughlan; that both drivers knew that this information was confidential

Ferrari information and that both knew that the information was being received by

Coughlan from Stepney.

weight distribution

3.5 On 21 March 2007 at 09.57 Mr. de la Rosa wrote to Coughlan in the following

terms:

“Hi Mike, do you know the Red Car’s Weight Distribution? It would be

important for us to know so that we could try it in the simulator. Thanks in

advance, Pedro.

p.s. I will be in the simulator tomorrow.”

3.6 In his evidence given to the WMSC, Mr. de la Rosa confirmed that Coughlan

replied by text message with precise details of Ferrari’s weight distribution.

3.7 On 25 March 2007 at 01.43 Mr. de la Rosa sent an e-mail to Fernando Alonso

which sets out Ferrari’s weight distribution to two decimal places on each of

Ferrari’s two cars as set up for the Australian Grand Prix.

3.8 Mr. Alonso replied to this e-mail on 25 March 2007 at 12.31 (they were in

different time zones). His e-mail includes a section headed “Ferrari” in which he

says “its weight distribution surprises me; I don’t know either if it’s 100%

reliable, but at least it draws attention”. The e-mail continues with a discussion

of how McLaren’s weight distribution compares with Ferrari’s.

3.9 Mr. de la Rosa replied on 25 March 2007 13.02 stating the following:

“All the information from Ferrari is very reliable. It comes from Nigel Stepney,

their former chief mechanic – I don’t know what post he holds now. He’s the

same person who told us in Australia that Kimi was stopping in lap 18. He’s very

friendly with Mike Coughlan, our Chief Designer, and he told him that.”

3.10 Mr. de la Rosa’s e-mail to Coughlan specifically stated that he wished to receive

Ferrari’s weight distribution for the purposes of testing it in the simulator the

following day (“It would be important for us to know so that we could try it in the

simulator”). Mr. de la Rosa explained to the WMSC at the meeting of 13

September 2007 that when Coughlan responded with the precise details in

question, he (de la Rosa) decided that the weight distribution was so different to

the McLaren car set up that it would not, in fact, be tested in the simulator. Mr de

la Rosa says that thereafter he regarded the information as unimportant. It seems

highly unlikely to the WMSC that a test driver would take a decision of this sort

on his own. It also is not clear why, if Mr. de la Rosa regarded this information as

unimportant, he would still convey and discuss it with Mr. Alonso some days later

in his e-mail exchange of 25th March. Mr. de la Rosa’s evidence also makes clear

that there was no reluctance or hesitation about testing the Ferrari information for

potential benefit, but only that on this occasion he says that there was a technical

reason not to do so.

3.11 McLaren's Chief Engineer Mr. Lowe gave clear evidence that decisions relating

to simulator testing would normally involve a number of engineering and other

staff (as would running the tests themselves). It seems highly unlikely that

decisions about what would be run in the simulator would by taken by a test

driver on his own.

flexible wing and aero balance

3.12 In the same e-mail exchange of 25 March 2007, Mr. de la Rosa states that tests

had been carried out on a flexible rear wing which Mr. de la Rosa says is “a copy

of the system we think Ferrari uses”. The Ferrari car’s precise aero balance at 250

kph is also identified. While it is conceivable that the former item could have

been copied from observation of the Ferrari car, it is clear from the context of the

exchange (it being part of the information that Mr. de la Rosa describes as being

“very reliable” because it comes from Stepney) that the latter item is confidential

to Ferrari and that it was passed to Mr. de la Rosa by Coughlan, who got it from

Stepney.

tyre gas

3.13 Mr de la Rosa’s e-mail to Mr. Alonso on 25 March 2007 at 01.43 identified a gas

that Ferrari uses to inflate its tyres to reduce the internal temperature and

blistering. The e-mail concludes with a statement (in relation to the gas) that

“we’ll have to try it, it’s easy!”.

3.14 Mr Alonso replied at 12.31 that it is “very important” that McLaren test the gas

that Ferrari uses in its tyres as “they have something different from the rest”, and

“not only this year. there is something else and this may be the key; let’s hope

we can test it during this test, and that we can make it a priority!”.

3.15 Mr. de la Rosa replied on 25 March 2007 13.02 stating the following: I agree

100% that we must test the [tyre gas] thing very soon.

3.16 Although the e-mail exchange between Mr. Alonso and Mr. de la Rosa makes

clear that they both were enthusiastic about trying the gas apparently used by

Ferrari in its tyres, Mr de la Rosa's evidence to the WMSC was that he, on his

own, decided to explore with a Bridgestone engineer whether the McLaren team

should try this gas. He states that he had no other conversations with any other

specialist staff within McLaren. His evidence is that the Bridgestone engineer in

question doubted whether the gas would confer an advantage upon McLaren.

According to Mr de la Rosa, without further consultation with anyone else at

McLaren, and despite the fact that this had apparently been successfully used at

Ferrari, the idea was dropped and no actual attempt was made to test the gas in the

tyres used by McLaren.

3.17 It seems unlikely to the WMSC that a test driver would engage in such

consultations on his own without discussing it any further with anyone else at the

team. It also seems unlikely that a decision on whether to pursue the matter

further would be taken by a test driver on his own. Finally, Mr de la Rosa’s

evidence makes clear that there was no reluctance or hesitation about using the

Ferrari information, but only that on this occasion it was concluded that there

would be no advantage in doing so.

braking system

3.18 On 12 April 2007 at 12.25 Mr. de la Rosa wrote to Mr. Coughlan and asked “ can

you explain me as much as you can, Ferrari’s braking system with the [reference

to detailed technical information]? Are they adjusting from inside the cockpit…?”

3.19 After a number of exchanges about whether a description would be too

complicated to articulate by e-mail, Mr. Coughlan replies on 14 April 2007 at

14.40 with a technical description which purports to be a description of the

principles underpinning the Ferrari braking system. Ferrari have confirmed that

the description given is an accurate (though incomplete) description of the

principles of its braking system. Coughlan concludes with a statement that “we

are looking at something similar”. This latter statement strongly suggests that the

McLaren system was being worked on from a position of knowledge of the details

of the Ferrari system, which, even if the Ferrari system not being directly copied,

must be more advantageous to McLaren than designing a system without such

knowledge.

3.20 The e-mail exchange between Mr. de la Rosa and Mr. Alonso dated 25 March

2007 at 01.43 also describes some aspects of the McLaren braking system and

states that “with the information that we have, we believe Ferrari has a similar

system” and goes on to describe highly specific elements of the Ferrari system

(which cannot be set out here for confidentiality reasons but which clearly

demonstrate knowledge of Ferrari’s confidential information).

stopping strategy

3.21 As mentioned above, Mr. de la Rosa’s e-mail on 25 March 2007 13.02 stated “all

the information from Ferrari is very reliable. It comes from Nigel Stepney, their

former chief mechanic – I don’t know what post he holds now. He’s the same

person who told us in Australia that Kimi was stopping in lap 18. He’s very

friendly with Mike Coughlan, our Chief Designer, and he told him that.

3.22 The evidence before the WMSC is that Mr. Räikkönen (Kimi) actually stopped at

lap 19 at the Australian GP. However, the fact remains that Mr de la Rosa cited

this information as a reason to believe that Stepney was a reliable source of

information. This strongly suggests that McLaren had at least taken account of

this information in determining its own strategy.

3.23 The evidence before the WMSC also demonstrates that Stepney had fed

information through Coughlan regarding which lap one or more of the Ferrari

drivers would stop at during the Bahrain Grand Prix. McLaren has sought to

discredit the significance of this information as it proved in the end to be

inaccurate. However, the evidence before the WMSC was that the safety car had

been deployed early in the race making it likely that stopping strategies would be

adjusted. This deployment of the safety car could not have been known in

advance of the race and the fact that the stoppage predictions proved inaccurate

does not mean that McLaren had not considered and taken account of the

information that had been received in determining its own strategy before the

race.

3.24 In any case, as there is no legitimate context in which another teams’ stopping

strategy would be revealed to McLaren in advance, there is very clear evidence

that both drivers knew that they were receiving unauthorised and confidential

Ferrari information. To the WMSC’s knowledge, no effort was taken to report or

stem this flow.

4 New Evidence – Communications between Coughlan and Stepney

4.1 The evidence put before the 26 July WMSC meeting indicated that a limited

number of contacts had occurred between Coughlan and Stepney. Coughlan’s

affidavit (submitted in the context of the High Court Proceedings) identified a

number of such contacts and described incidents where specific Ferrari

confidential information was transferred to him. The WMSC considered these

contacts but had no specific evidence of further or other contacts. The focus at

the 26 July WMSC meeting was on the circumstances surrounding the

transmission of the 780 page Ferrari dossier discovered at Coughlan’s home.

4.2 New evidence has come to light which strongly indicates that the transmission of

confidential Ferrari information from Stepney to Coughlan was not limited to the

780 page dossier. This evidence demonstrates that a far greater level of

communication existed between Coughlan and Stepney than was appreciated at

the 26 July WMSC meeting. This evidence was submitted by Ferrari and is

deemed credible as it originates from the Italian police and is the result of an

official analysis of records of telephone, SMS and e-mail contacts between

Coughlan and Stepney. The evidence included the following.

4.3 In its report “Allegato 18”, the Italian Police demonstrated that in the period 21

March to 3 July 2007, Coughlan received 23 calls from Stepney’s personal mobile

phone and made four calls to that phone. In the same period, Coughlan received

124 SMS messages from Stepney and sent 66 SMS messages to Stepney.

4.4 In its report “Allegato 9” the Italian Police have identified logs which show 23 emails

passed between Coughlan and Stepney between 1 March and 14 April

2007.

4.5 In its report “Allegato 10” the Italian police have identified a further 98 SMS

messages and a further eight telephone calls (on different phones) between

Coughlan and Stepney between 11 March and 14 April 2007.

4.6 In total, at least 288 SMS messages and 35 telephone calls appear to have passed

between Coughlan and Stepney between 11 March 2007 and 3 July 2007.

4.7 The number of contacts increased considerably during private tests carried out by

Ferrari in Malaysia at the end of March 2007 and in the run up to and during the

days of the Grands Prix in Australia on 18 March 2007, Malaysia on 8 April

2007, Bahrain on 15 April 2007 and Spain on 13 May 2007.

4.8 The evidence of the Italian police that has been produced also states that Stepney

sought technical details from Ferrari’s chief mechanic, Mr Uguzzoni, about tests

carried out by Ferrari in Malaysia in a way that drew attention within Ferrari at

the time.

4.9 In addition, e-mails between McLaren drivers were produced to the 13 September

WMSC meeting (see above) stating clearly that Coughlan had received

information from Stepney regarding the Ferrari car and had passed this

information to others within the McLaren team.

4.10 Neither Ferrari nor McLaren have ever disputed (whether at the 26 July WMSC

meeting or since) that confidential Ferrari information was passed from Stepney

to Coughlan during the period in question. However, the new evidence regarding

the number and timing of the contacts makes it far more likely that there was a

systematic flow of Ferrari confidential information to Coughlan leading to the

conclusion that the illicit communication of information was very likely not

limited to the transmission of the Ferrari dossier discovered at Coughlan’s home

on 3 July 2007. This conclusion is corroborated in the e-mails exchanged

between McLaren’s drivers (see above).

4.11 McLaren stated in its submissions for the 13 September WMSC meeting that this

new evidence on the number and timing of the communications merely confirmed

what was already known: that Coughlan and Stepney were illicitly sharing Ferrari

confidential information. It has also been suggested by McLaren that Coughlan

and Stepney were acting on their own account and that possibly they were

planning to seek new employment together elsewhere.

4.12 Without drawing a definitive conclusion on this point, the WMSC considered that

it was difficult to reconcile this version of events with the number and timing of

the contacts described above as if Coughlan and Stepney had simply been sharing

information to facilitate a plan to search for new employment there would appear

to be no particular reason for the contacts to have intensified around the tests and

the Grands Prix and no reason for Coughlan to share information with McLaren’s

drivers. Rather, it appeared more likely that the information being exchanged

related to those tests and the Grands Prix.

4.13 Further, in light of Coughlan’s role within the McLaren team, it had seemed

unlikely to the WMSC at the meeting on 26 July 2007 that Coughlan himself

would have been able to make any direct or immediate use (whether personal or

within his role at McLaren) of up to date information relating to the Ferrari car at

the site of different Grands Prix. However, as detailed above, at the 13 September

WMSC meeting, the WMSC heard new evidence to suggest that this was not the

case and that Coughlan had, in fact, communicated to at least one McLaren driver

statements from Stepney of which lap the Ferrari drivers would stop at during

both the Australian Grand Prix and the Bahrain Grand Prix. These

communications between Coughlan and at least one of the McLaren drivers

coincided exactly in time with some of the most intense period of contact between

Coughlan and Stepney described above.

4.14 In the absence of another explanation, in light of the number and timing of the

communications between Coughlan and Stepney and the e-mail exchanges

between the McLaren drivers (see above), the WMSC regards it as reasonable to

infer that Coughlan was in receipt of a flow of confidential Ferrari information

from Stepney and that at least some of that information was communicated to

others within McLaren (e.g. Mr. de la Rosa and Mr. Alonso).

4.15 In sum, the new information on the number and timing of the contacts between

Coughlan and Stepney inevitably had an impact on the WMSC’s appreciation of

the nature of the contacts between Coughlan and Stepney, on its appreciation of

the emails between the drivers and on the likelihood of Ferrari confidential

information received by Coughlan having an influence on his work with

McLaren.

5 Coughlan’s Role at McLaren

5.1 McLaren’s submission made for and at the 26 July WMSC meeting indicated that

Coughlan had a relatively limited managerial role and that it would not be

possible for him to propose ideas without having to explain their provenance. In

McLaren’s submission, this demonstrated that, despite having detailed Ferrari

technical information, Coughlan could not have used any of this information to

benefit McLaren without a significant number of people at McLaren knowing.

McLaren submitted statements from a number of its engineers that those

engineers were not aware of changes made to the McLaren car using confidential

Ferrari information.

5.2 The submissions made for the 13 September WMSC meeting show that that

Coughlan may have had a more active role in the design of the McLaren car than

previously appreciated by the WMSC.

5.3 The WMSC does not have evidence that any complete Ferrari design was copied

and subsequently wholly incorporated into the McLaren car as a result of

Coughlan passing confidential from Stepney to McLaren. However, it is difficult

to accept that the secret Ferrari information that was within Coughlan’s

knowledge never influenced his judgement in the performance of his duties. It is

not necessary for McLaren to have copied a complete Ferrari design for it to have

benefited from Coughlan’s knowledge. For example, the secret Ferrari

information cannot but have informed the views Coughlan expressed to others in

the McLaren design department, for example regarding which design projects to

prioritise or which research to pursue. The advantage gained may have been as

subtle as Coughlan being in a position to suggest alternative ways of approaching

different design challenges.

6 Evidence of Mr. Neale

6.1 At the 26 July WMSC meeting (and the evidence was repeated at the hearing of

13 September) it was noted that Coughlan had revealed to his superior at

McLaren, Mr. Neale, that Stepney had attempted to pass secret Ferrari

information to Coughlan. A firewall was set up at the instigation of Mr. Neale to

prevent further contacts from Stepney and Coughlan was directed to cease contact

with Stepney. Within a matter of weeks thereafter, Coughlan attempted to show

some photographs to Mr. Neale which, according to Mr. Neale himself, because

of the manner in which they were produced, suggested to Mr. Neale that they

should not have been in Coughlan’s possession. Rather than establish the facts

and take appropriate action as his superior at McLaren, Mr. Neale advised

Coughlan to destroy the photographs. Coming as soon as it did after McLaren

had been required to install a firewall and had directed this same employee to

cease contact with a known source of Ferrari confidential information, the WMSC

notes that it is very unsatisfactory that no further action was taken to investigate

this matter further and make appropriate disclosures to the FIA as regulator.

7 Nature of the information held by McLaren

7.1 The WMSC believes that the nature of the information illicitly held by McLaren

was information of a nature which, if used or in any way taken into account, could

confer a significant sporting advantage upon McLaren.

7.2 Evidence was submitted at the 13 September WMSC meeting by McLaren’s

Engineering Director, Mr. Lowe, that the dossier of Ferrari information found in

Coughlan’s possession did not contain information of particular use or interest to

McLaren on the basis that the McLaren car was significantly different to the

Ferrari car. This submission was apparently made on the basis of the review of

the index to the dossier of Ferrari documents (Mr. Lowe having stated that he had

not seen the dossier itself).

7.3 The WMSC does not accept this account. In both WMSC hearings and in written

submissions, and from the direct knowledge of the WMSC Members, Formula

One teams have great interest in each others’ technology and go to considerable

lengths (within the rules) to study each other’s designs and innovations through

direct observation, photographic evidence and other means. In addition the

technical information in Coughlan’s possession was, in the WMSC’s

appreciation, highly significant and could certainly confer a sporting advantage, if

used or taken into account.

8 WMSC’s Assessment

8.1 The WMSC has carefully considered the evidence and submissions of all parties.

8.2 It has concluded (and intends to re-affirm) that a breach of Article 151© has

occurred.

8.3 In the 26 July Decision, the WMSC found a breach of Article 151©. In

assessing the gravity of that breach, it took account of a number of factors

including any evidence (or, at the time, lack of it) to suggest that the Ferrari

information improperly held had actually been used and actually conferred a

sporting advantage. Other factors that it took into account included the argument

that there was little evidence of the information in question being disseminated to

others at McLaren, what the WMSC then understood to be Coughlan’s more

limited role and the argument that Coughlan was a single rogue employee.

8.4 McLaren has made detailed submissions indicating that none of the information

received enhanced the McLaren car. McLaren has suggested to the WMSC that

unless “actual use” and a demonstrated and itemised performance advantage can

be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e. to a criminal law standard of proof), the

WMSC is not permitted at law to impose a penalty.

8.5 The WMSC rejects this suggestion. The WMSC has full jurisdiction to apply

Article 151© and stresses that it is not necessary for it to demonstrate that any

confidential Ferrari information was directly copied by McLaren or put to direct

use in the McLaren car to justify a finding that Article 151© was breached and/or

that a penalty is merited. Nor does the WMSC need to show that any information

improperly held led to any specifically identified sporting advantage, or indeed

any advantage at all. Rather, the WMSC is entitled to treat possession of another

team’s information as an offence meriting a penalty on its own if it so chooses.

8.6 The fact that in its 26 July Decision, based on more limited evidence, the Council

had a different appreciation of the gravity of McLaren’s breach does not lead to

the creation of a legal test regarding the WMSC’s burden of proof. The WMSC

could have imposed a penalty with the 26 July Decision based on the evidence

therein, but chose not to (based in part on McLaren’s submissions that there had

been no dissemination of Ferrari information beyond Mr Coughlan).

8.7 The WMSC has taken note of McLaren’s position that an injustice would occur if

a penalty were imposed without the FIA having accepted McLaren’s offer to

inspect the McLaren premises and designs for evidence of Ferrari technology

having been copied. However, as noted above, neither the finding of a breach nor

the imposition of a penalty require evidence of McLaren having directly

incorporated Ferrari technology. Nonetheless, the WMSC have noted and taken

account of the open and co-operative nature of this offer and taken this into

account in reaching this Decision.

8.8 In light of the evidence now before it, the WMSC does not accept that the only

actions of McLaren deserving censure were those of Coughlan. While this

situation might have originated with the actions of a single rogue McLaren

employee acting on his own and without McLaren’s knowledge or consent,

evidence is now available which, when taken in its full context, makes clear that:

- Coughlan had more information than previously appreciated and was

receiving information in a systematic manner over a period of months;

- the information has been disseminated, at least to some degree (e.g. to Mr. de

la Rosa and Mr. Alonso), within the McLaren team;

- the information being disseminated within the McLaren team included not

only highly sensitive technical information but also secret information

regarding Ferrari’s sporting strategy;

- Mr de la Rosa, in the performance of his functions at McLaren, requested and

received secret Ferrari information from a source which he knew to be

illegitimate and expressly stated that the purpose of his request was to run

tests in the simulator;

- the secret information in question was shared with Mr. Alonso;

- there was a clear intention on the part of a number of McLaren personnel to

use some of the Ferrari confidential information in its own testing. If this was

not in fact carried into effect it was only because there were technical reasons

not to do so;

- Coughlan’s role within McLaren (as now understood by the WMSC) put him

in a position in which his knowledge of the secret Ferrari information would

have influenced him in the performance of his duties.

8.9 It seems to the WMSC clear that Coughlan’s actions were intended by him to give

McLaren a sporting advantage. He fed information about Ferrari’s stopping

strategy, braking system, weight distribution and other matters to McLaren's test

driver. Furthermore, in light of Coughlan's undoubted experience, he is likely to

have known a great deal about how to confer an advantage and the roles of

different personnel within the team. It seems most unlikely that he confined his

activities to sharing Ferrari's information with Mr. de la Rosa. It also seems most

unlikely that his own work was not influenced in some way by the knowledge

regarding the Ferrari car that he is known to have possessed.

8.10 Furthermore, it seems entirely unlikely to the WMSC that any Formula One

driver would bear the sole responsibility for handling or processing sensitive

Ferrari information (e.g. on substances used to inflate tyres or weight distribution)

or deciding how or whether such information would be used or tested. In light of

his experience, Coughlan would have known this and if he intended to reveal this

information to McLaren, he is unlikely to have done so only to Mr. de la Rosa .

8.11 The WMSC therefore finds that a number of McLaren employees or agents were

in unauthorised possession of, or knew or should have known that other McLaren

employees or agents were in unauthorised possession of, highly confidential

Ferrari technical information. In addition, the WMSC finds that there was an

intention on the part of a number of McLaren personnel to use some of the Ferrari

confidential information in its own testing.

8.12 The evidence leads the WMSC to conclude that some degree of sporting

advantage was obtained, though it may forever be impossible to quantify that

advantage in concrete terms.

8.13 These factors lead the WMSC to an appreciation of the gravity of McLaren’s

breach which is materially different to the appreciation in the 26 July Decision.

On this occasion the WMSC believes that a penalty is merited.

8.14 Having indicated to McLaren that a penalty was likely to be imposed, the WMSC

heard submissions regarding the appropriateness of penalties from McLaren and

from counsel for Mr. Hamilton. The WMSC has reached its decision having

taken due account of those submissions.

9 Decision

9.1 For the foregoing reasons, the WMSC finds McLaren in breach of Article 151©

of the International Sporting Code.

9.2 The WMSC therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the International

Sporting Code, imposes the following sanctions relation to the 2007 FIA Formula

One World Championship:

- a penalty consisting of exclusion from and withdrawal of all points awarded to

McLaren in all rounds of the 2007 Constructors’ Championship. For the

avoidance of doubt, McLaren will be permitted to race in the remaining rounds of

the 2007 Championship but will not be permitted to score points in the

Constructors Championship or attend the podium in the event of a top three finish

in any of the remaining races in the 2007 season. Points scored by other

competitors in the Championship to date will not be affected further to the

withdrawal of McLaren’s points;

- a fine of USD100 million (less any sum that would have been payable by

Formula One Management Limited on account of McLaren’s results in the 2007

Constructors Championship had it not been excluded). This fine shall be payable

within three months from the date of this Decision.

9.3 Exceptionally, because primary responsibility must rest with McLaren, in the

interests of the sport and also because McLaren’s drivers were offered immunity

from individual sanction by the President of the FIA in his letter dated 30 August

2007, the WMSC does not consider that it is appropriate to impose any sanction

on them individually or impose sanctions on McLaren which would affect these

drivers’ individual Championship standings. As such, both McLaren drivers will

retain all the drivers’ Championship points they have won so far in the 2007

season and will be permitted to win drivers’ Championship points and attend the

podium in the remaining races of the 2007 season.

9.4 In addition, in the interest of ensuring that McLaren is not unfairly advantaged as

against any of its competitors in the 2008 Championship, the WMSC instructs the

FIA technical department to conduct an investigation of McLaren’s preparatory

work on its 2008 car with a view to determining whether that car incorporates any

Ferrari confidential information and report back before the WMSC meeting of

December 2007. Once the WMSC has considered this report, a separate Decision

will be taken regarding McLaren’s participation in the 2008 Championship,

including whether any penalty should be imposed. This present Decision does not

in any way affect McLaren’s entitlement to participate in the 2008 Championship

if the entry conditions are fulfilled.

9.5 McLaren is reminded of its right of appeal. In the event that an appeal is lodged

with the FIA International Court of Appeal, the effect of this Decision will not be

suspended pending the outcome of that appeal.

Signed:

__________________________________________

Max Mosley

FIA President

Paris, 13 September 2007

Modificato Settembre 14, 2007 da Anomander Rake

[Jean Valjean]

il ragionamento di Maurice non fa una grinza anche se forse le mie conclusioni sono differenti (non definisco la sentenza una pagliacciata ma un equilibrato compromesso).

Quanto abbia guadagnato la McLaren grazie ai segreti della Ferrari non lo sapremo mai. Per me il mondiale lo vinceranno i piloti McLaren perché si sono dimostrati più costanti e la loro monoposto più affidabile.

Trovo molto interessante che i tifosi ferraristi si scaglino contro Dennis e la McLaren ma non abbiano speso neanche una parola di biasimo per la loro squadra che tanto pulita poi non lo è (a Melbourne portava in pista una monoposto chiaramente irregolare ed è stata smascherata da Stepney. Non ci fosse stato lui e avessero vinto il mondiale grazie a quelle soluzioni tutti a festeggiare, vero? Tanto nel frattempo la Fia avrebbe cambiato il regolamento per renderle legali ;-) ).

Anche il timing è interessantissimo. Da quanto la Ferrari sapeva? (non lo sapremo mai, così come non sapremo mai come mai Stepney avesse tante informazioni). Certo è che hanno tirato fuori la bega quando hanno cominciato ad arrancare nel mondiale. Non esiste la controprova, ma la mia opinione è che se la Ferrari avesse dominato il mondiale la spy story non sarebbe esistita.

[mauricefree]

il ragionamento di Maurice non fa una grinza anche se forse le mie conclusioni sono differenti (non definisco la sentenza una pagliacciata ma un equilibrato compromesso).

Quanto abbia guadagnato la McLaren grazie ai segreti della Ferrari non lo sapremo mai. Per me il mondiale lo vinceranno i piloti McLaren perché si sono dimostrati più costanti e la loro monoposto più affidabile.

Trovo molto interessante che i tifosi ferraristi si scaglino contro Dennis e la McLaren ma non abbiano speso neanche una parola di biasimo per la loro squadra che tanto pulita poi non lo è (a Melbourne portava in pista una monoposto chiaramente irregolare ed è stata smascherata da Stepney. Non ci fosse stato lui e avessero vinto il mondiale grazie a quelle soluzioni tutti a festeggiare, vero? Tanto nel frattempo la Fia avrebbe cambiato il regolamento per renderle legali ;-) ).

Anche il timing è interessantissimo. Da quanto la Ferrari sapeva? (non lo sapremo mai, così come non sapremo mai come mai Stepney avesse tante informazioni). Certo è che hanno tirato fuori la bega quando hanno cominciato ad arrancare nel mondiale. Non esiste la controprova, ma la mia opinione è che se la Ferrari avesse dominato il mondiale la spy story non sarebbe esistita.

Anch'io sono d'accordo con molte delle tue conclusioni, meno"sull'equilibrato compromesso":

Ma scusa, se la Mc Laren ha utilizzato i dossier (anche solo tramite i due spagnoli da Coughlan), cioé Alonso ha ricevuto direttamente da DLR e quindi indirettamente da Coughlan delle info sulle ripartizioni dei pesi della Ferrari e sulle Bridgestone vuol dire che hanno utilizzato, consapevolmente anchei piloti (Alonso almeno) dei dati che non dovevano sapere.

A questo punto seppur Mc Larenista, dico: troppa la punizione economica ma forse anche il pilota o i piloti che hanno "gozzovigliato "con e.mail con segreti di altra scuderìa avrebbero dovuto essere puniti.

Così si è scelto il compromesso per non rovinare l'immagine del mondiale e l'interesse su di esso, accontentare in buona sostanza la Ferrari (titolo costruttori e verità emersa), e lasciare il titolo piloti alla Mc Laren....ripeto come dire:

Io sentenzio...ma poi DIVIDETEVI LA TORTA.

Modificato Settembre 15, 2007 da mauricefree

[Jean Valjean]

Ma scusa, se la Mc Laren ha utilizzato i dossier (anche solo tramite i due spagnoli da Coughlan), cioé Alonso ha ricevuto direttamente da DLR e quindi indirettamente da Coughlan delle info sulle ripartizioni dei pesi della Ferrari e sulle Bridgestone vuol dire che hanno utilizzato, consapevolmente anchei piloti (Alonso almeno) dei dati che non dovevano sapere.

ma i piloti avevano l'immunità

e poi comunque alonso sarà punito in pista hai visto che sta già mettendo le mani avanti? "speriamo che domenica sia una gara regolare".

diciamo la verità anche la f1 come il calcio sta diventando più una battaglia mediatica che in pista.

e naturalmente Forza Hamilton, stendi il cafone :rolleyes:

[mauricefree]

ma i piloti avevano l'immunità

e poi comunque alonso sarà punito in pista hai visto che sta già mettendo le mani avanti? "speriamo che domenica sia una gara regolare".

diciamo la verità anche la f1 come il calcio sta diventando più una battaglia mediatica che in pista.

e naturalmente Forza Hamilton, stendi il cafone :rolleyes:

I completely agree with you!

Ma di Fonso temo il sorpasso nelle ultimissime gare...

Occorre che Lewis dia il tutto per tutto attaccando in gara anche rischiando il contatto...se si troverà dietro. Perchè l'esperienza sulle ultime quattro piste sarà un fattore importante per Fonzie...che nella forza politica mi assomiglia sempre più ad un certo "Professore".....

Modificato Settembre 15, 2007 da mauricefree

[Giocus]

La sentenza manca della parte riguardante i piloti che hanno beneficiato della legge sui pentiti anche se chi sapeva e poteva parlare era solo Alonso... Hamilton non sapeva niente ma sarebbe stato giustamente penalizzato anche lui come beneficiario diretto delle scorrettezze praticate dalla sua scuderia. Viceversa l'accordo Alonso-FIA gli ha salvato il culo... Oserei dire l'ennesimo colpo di culo del negretto...

Intanto la pista sta sentenziando chi va più forte fra i piloti McLaren: Alonso. In ferrari stavolta il quasi pareggio ha favorito Raikkonen (17 millesimoi in prova con meno benzina significa che massa ancora una volta non era stato da meno) ma in gara il finnico si è rifatto non facendosi passare dal compagno al pit stop.

Il mondiale sarebbe stato più giusto ed equilibrato con qualche punto tolto anche ai piloti (diciamo una decina), mentre così se la giocano i due mclaren... A questo punto speriamo vinca il migliore, cioè Alonso...

[mauricefree]

La sentenza manca della parte riguardante i piloti che hanno beneficiato della legge sui pentiti anche se chi sapeva e poteva parlare era solo Alonso... Hamilton non sapeva niente ma sarebbe stato giustamente penalizzato anche lui come beneficiario diretto delle scorrettezze praticate dalla sua scuderia. Viceversa l'accordo Alonso-FIA gli ha salvato il culo... Oserei dire l'ennesimo colpo di culo del negretto...

Intanto la pista sta sentenziando chi va più forte fra i piloti McLaren: Alonso. In ferrari stavolta il quasi pareggio ha favorito Raikkonen (17 millesimoi in prova con meno benzina significa che massa ancora una volta non era stato da meno) ma in gara il finnico si è rifatto non facendosi passare dal compagno al pit stop.

Il mondiale sarebbe stato più giusto ed equilibrato con qualche punto tolto anche ai piloti (diciamo una decina), mentre così se la giocano i due mclaren... A questo punto speriamo vinca il migliore, cioè Alonso...

Ettepareva Gio' che adesso LH debba ringraziare Alonso perchè Fonzie ha messo nella merda la Mc Laren collaborando con la FIA (da cui ora, parole di ieri di Mosley è un protetto speciale); poi il giro di mail erano tra Coughlan e Deralrosa che che passava ad Alonso quindi ha saputo per tutto quest'anno di guidare un auto avendo dei vantaggi anche solo conosciutivi che l'hanno avvantaggiato, e non avrebbe dovuto essere punito?

Bah il mondo è bello perchè è vario....

Ma Alonso è il migliore no?....si puo' permettere tutto....anche l'impunità e le protezioni speciali della FIA.

P.S.: Beh ma poi la battuta legge sui pentiti... che é? la FIA è diventata una copia sportiva della Procura di Palermo?

Modificato Settembre 17, 2007 da mauricefree